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THE COSTS OF MANDATORY COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS IN SEC RULEMAKING
Donna M. Nagy*
ABSTRACT
Cost-benefit analysis can be a valuable tool when deployed at the Securities and
Exchange Commission's discretion to improve its rulemaking process and the
overall quality of SEC rules. However, when a cost-benefit analysis obligation is
imposed externally whether from an explicit statutory command or from a defacto
requirement enforced through judicial review-the costs of that mandatory cost-
benefit analysis can be quite substantial. This Article identifies and explores the
qualitative costs that that have already been incurred, and are bound to continue, if
the adequacy ofthe SEC's cost-benefit analysis remains subject to extensive judicial
scrutiny. These costs will only intensify if Congress amends the federal securities
laws to add a host of new and onerous cost-benefit analysis requirements.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........ 130
I. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT REGIME ................. ........... 133
A. Existing Statutory Provisions, Executive Orders, and SEC Practices Relating
to Cost-Benefit Analysis ........................................ 133
1. The Statutory Framework. .............................. ..... 133
2. The Executive Branch ...................................... 136
3. The SEC's Policies and Practices .................................. 137
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements Imposed Through Judicial
Interpretation ................................................... 139
C. Legislative Attempts to Heighten the SEC's Existing Cost-Benefit Analysis
Obligations. ............................................... 146
* Executive Associate Dean and C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law, Indiana
University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington. I presented this Article at the ILEP 20th
Annual Symposium on Business Litigation and Regulatory Agency Review in the Era of the
Roberts Court. I am grateful to Edward Labaton, Arizona Law Review editors, and my fellow
symposium participants. The Article has also benefited from helpful insights and comments
by Professors Hannah Buxbaum, Max Huffman, Margaret Sachs, and Hillary Sale, and from
faculty presentations at Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Indiana University
McKinney School of Law, and Washington University School of Law.
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:1
II. TiHE RAMIFICATIONS OF MANDATORY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS
....................................... 149
A. SEC Paralysis ..................................................... 149
B. Investor-Driven Rulemaking Challenges ............... ........... 151
C. Regulation by Enforcement .............................. ...... 154
D. Informal Guidance That Creates New and Practically Binding Law ......... 156
E. Fewer Congressional Delegations of Authority or Discretion to the SEC.. 158
CONCLUSION .................................................. ......... 159
INTRODUCTION
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has exercised
its congressionally delegated rulemaking power on thousands of occasions since
1934, there have been relatively few litigation challenges seeking judicial review of
SEC rules. Moreover, in those infrequent instances where litigants have challenged
a rule's validity, courts traditionally have accorded substantial deference both to the
SEC's process-based choices, as well as to the policy decisions reflected in the final
rule. Over the last decade, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
has held that several challenged SEC rules were "arbitrary and capricious"-and
therefore invalid-due to a perceived failure on the part of the SEC to conduct
adequate cost-benefit analysis.' As a result, the SEC no longer deploys rigorous
cost-benefit analysis as a discretionary tool to improve the rulemaking process and
the overall quality of the rules themselves. Instead, rigorous cost-benefit analysis
has now become a de facto requirement for the SEC's adoption of most new rules.
In May 2013, the House of Representatives passed legislation by a vote of 235-161
that attempted to codify and considerably heighten this cost-benefit analysis
obligation. 2
Yet, there is no escaping the fact that an astonishingly small amount of
analysis has actually been performed on the costs and benefits of such mandatory
cost-benefit analysis. Professor John Coates explores this irony in a recent paper,
which pointedly questions whether it is even possible for the SEC and other financial
regulators to conduct meaningful cost-benefit analyses.3 His ultimate conclusion-
that externally imposed cost-benefit analysis requirements "can be expected to do
more to camouflage discretionary choices than to discipline agencies or promote
democracy"-challenges both sides of the cost-benefit analysis debate to more
carefully contemplate their positions.4 As Professor Coates recently tweeted, "Why
1. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also
Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177-79 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142-44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
2. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 1062, 113th Cong. § 2 (as passed
by House, May 17, 2013).
3. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015).
4. Id. at 882.
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impose new cost-benefit tests when cost-benefit analysis tests haven't been shown
to satisfy a cost-benefit test?"
I will leave it to others to wrangle over the benefits of cost-benefit analysis
(whether discretionary or mandatory) in SEC rulemaking.6 Others are also in a better
position to estimate the economic costs of performing and defending "adequate"
cost-benefit analysis (leaving aside the question of what is adequate)-although
here we can glean some insight from those costs associated with the proxy access
rule that was invalidated in Business Roundtable v. SEC.7 The SEC has reported that
"approximately 21,000 staff hours were spent on the proxy access rulemaking at an
estimated labor cost of approximately $2.2 million spread over more than two years,
[with] an additional 2,700 staff hours . . . on the ensuing litigation at an estimated
labor cost of approximately $315,000" 8-thus, the monetary cost of the cost-benefit
analysis could be estimated from there.
My aim in this Article is to focus instead on some of the qualitative costs
that have already been incurred, and are bound to continue, if the adequacy of the
SEC's cost-benefit analysis remains subject to extensive judicial scrutiny. These
costs will only intensify if Congress amends the federal securities laws to require
the SEC to comply with a host of new cost-benefit analysis requirements.
The Article proceeds in two parts. Part I first examines the most important
statutory provisions, executive orders, and agency practices that relate to cost-
benefit analysis in SEC rulemaking. It then discusses the judicial decisions that have
left SEC officials convinced that many months, and oftentimes years, of quantitative
cost-benefit analysis is a necessary precursor to the SEC's adoption of any
controversial new rule. Part I concludes with a discussion of the proposed SEC
5. John Coates, John Coates, TWITTER (Jan. 7, 2014, 3:54 PM),
https://twitter.com/jciv/status/420705023908003840. Professor Coates is not alone in
highlighting this irony. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Emotional Impact Analysis in Financial
Regulation: Going Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis 4 (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/econpaper62.pdf (observing that
"[w]hether CBA would pass a CBA is an open empirical question" and acknowledging that
cost-benefit analysis "itself might fail a CBA test because its costs may exceed its benefits").
6. Compare Coates, supra note 3, at 888 (arguing that the benefits of cost-benefit
analysis "are likely to remain low" because of an inability "to precisely and reliability
estimate the effects of financial regulation"), and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for
Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S352 (2014)
(contending that cost-benefit analysis "as applied to financial regulation is a serious category
mistake"), with Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial
Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S1 (2014) (contending that cost-benefit analysis is particularly
apt for financial regulation and that financial regulators should be gathering even more data
and performing even more rigorous analyses), and Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-
Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 AM. EcON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 393,
397 (2013) (proposing "principles for the quantitative evaluations of normative trade-offs in
the regulation of financial markets").
7. 647 F.3d at 1148.
8. Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairperson, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to Scott
Garrett, Representative, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Aug. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Schapiro
Letter], available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/sec-and-
governance/SEC-letter%208-5-1 1.pdf
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Regulatory Accountability Act, which sets out a host of complex requirements that
would make legally sufficient rulemaking exceedingly difficult. The proposed
legislation imposes an uber cost-benefit analysis mandate that would require the
SEC to explain why a new regulation meets its identified regulatory objectives
"more effectively" than other available alternatives.9 Additionally, this cost-benefit
analysis would obligate the SEC to "choose the approach that maximizes net
benefits." 0 The proposed legislation would also require the SEC to explain the
nature of the comments that it received in the course of its rulemaking process, the
changes that it made in response to those comments, and "the reasons that the
Commission did not incorporate those industry group concerns related to the
potential costs or benefits in the final rule."" Conspicuously absent is any
concomitant obligation on the part of the SEC to explain its reasons for failing to
incorporate investor protection groups or other non-industry concerns regarding
potential costs or benefits.
Part II then sets out to identify and explain the troubling consequences that
flow from cost-benefit analysis rulemaking requirements that strip away the SEC's
discretion and, thus, its ability to function efficiently as an expert independent
regulatory agency. It first discusses how the extensive scrutiny applied by the D.C.
Circuit, in the words of one scholar, "shook the SEC's confidence in its ability to
adopt rules that would survive judicial scrutiny." 12 This scrutiny effectively forced
the agency to expend substantial amounts of time and resources on cost-benefit
analyses that often amount to no more than unreliable "guesstimation."1 As a result,
the SEC's adoption of new rules-including a host of new regulations required by
the Dodd-Frank Act of 201014 and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups ("JOBS")
Act of 2012"-has been hampered substantially.16
In addition to such "paralysis by analysis," 1 7 Part II posits four equally
disconcerting costs of mandatory cost-benefit analysis requirements: (1) a future
9. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 1062, 113th Cong., § 2 (as passed
by House, May 17, 2013) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78w(e)(1)(C)).
10. Id. § (e)(2)(A).
11. Id. § (e)(3).
12. Barbara Black, Curbing Broker-Dealers' Abusive Sales Practices: Does
Professor Jensen's Integrity Framework Offer a Better Approach?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv
771, 783 (2013).
13. See Coates, supra note 3, at 887.
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd-Frank Act).
15. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) [hereinafter JOBS Act].
16. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy ofDodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1019,
1066 (2012) (noting the "substantial cloud over the SEC's continuing ability to adopt other
rules implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, even those not related to corporate governance").
17. Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 7, 50 (1998)
(observing that "[m]ost regulatory reformers prescribe an exceedingly ambitious cost-benefit
analysis that would inevitably drain scarce agency analytical resources and slow down the
rulemaking process" and suggesting that "paralysis may have been the ulterior goal of
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that will almost certainly include rulemaking challenges initiated by investor
protection groups seeking to invalidate deregulatory rules (based on claims that the
SEC underestimated the investor protection benefits and overestimated the
regulatory burdens on those subject to the status quo); (2) a greater predilection for
"securities regulation by enforcement,"" whereby the SEC entirely bypasses the
rulemaking process on particularly contentious issues to "formulat[e] new
regulatory policy through the prosecution of enforcement cases";1 9 (3) heightened
reliance on informal mechanisms, most notably no-action letters, which enable the
SEC staff to graft new substantive requirements onto existing law under the guise
of regulatory interpretations ;20 and (4) fewer delegations of authority to the SEC and
more "do-it-yourself' securities regulation by a Congress composed of non-expert
decision-makers who can dispense with any type of cost-benefit analysis-
quantitative or qualitative-whenever they deem it politically expedient to do so.
I. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT REGIME
A. Existing Statutory Provisions, Executive Orders, and SEC Practices Relating
to Cost-Benefit Analysis
1. The Statutory Framework
The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA") is
frequently cited as the statutory source of the SEC's purported obligation to perform
cost-benefit analysis in its rulemaking. 21 The NSMIA added a new § 2(b) to the
Securities Act of 1933, a new § 3(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and a
new § 3(c) to the Investment Company Act of 1940, all of which provide that
whenever the SEC "is engaged in rulemaking ... and is required to consider or
determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether
some . . . who were not so concerned with achieving efficient regulation as with throwing
sand into the regulatory gears").
18. Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149 (1990).
19. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 95 (1982).
20. See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC
No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921
(1998).
21. See, e.g., Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
CT. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, THE IMPORTANCE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN
FINANCIAL REGULATION 6 (2013), available at http:// www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/CBA-Report-3.10.13.pdf (concluding that the NSMIA's
"legislative history indicates that Congress intended to require cost-benefit analysis");
Jonathan D. Guynn, Note, The Political Economy of Financial Rulemaking After Business
Roundtable, 99 VA. L. REV. 641, 647-48 (2013) ("The first statute to impose CBA mandates
on an independent financial regulatory agency was the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996.").
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the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 2 2 A few
years later, in the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999, Congress imposed on the SEC
that identical obligation in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.23
These statutory provisions, however, fall far short of a congressional
command to engage in any type of cost-benefit analysis, much less the quantitative
cost-benefit analysis that has been effectively required for an SEC rule to survive
judicial review. The aforementioned text merely obligates the SEC to "consider"
factors relating to efficiency, competition, and capital formation in the course of
agency rulemaking where it is also obliged to consider investor protection. 2 4
Decades before the NSMIA, Congress imposed a similar "consider" command in
§ 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, which states that the SEC shall, "in making rules
and regulations . . . [,] consider among other matters the impact any such rule or
regulation would have on competition." 25 The subsection further instructs that the
SEC "shall not adopt any such rule or regulation which would impose a burden on
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of [the
Exchange Act]," and requires a written statement of the "reasons" for the
"determination that any [such] burden on competition . . . is necessary and
appropriate in the furtherance of the purposes of [the Exchange Act]." 26
When Congress wants to require an agency to perform cost-benefit
analysis, it clearly knows how to impose that obligation. An often invoked example
is the Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), which is required by
the terms of the Commodity Exchange Act not only to "consider the costs and
benefits" of its actions but also to "evaluate[ ]" those costs and benefits "in light of'
five factors: "(A) considerations of protection of market participants and the public;
(B) considerations of the efficiency, competitiveness, and financial integrity of
futures markets; (C) considerations of price discovery; (D) considerations of sound
risk management practices; and (E) other public interest considerations." 2 7 The
proposed SEC Regulatory Accountability Act provides another obvious example. 28
The fact that the SEC is presently obligated under the NSMIA to
"consider ... efficiency, competition, and capital formation" in rulemakings when
it is also required to "consider ... the public interest" clearly reflects a congressional
determination that SEC rules must take into account an array of regulatory
objectives beyond simply investor protection. But there is nothing in the text of those
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(b), 78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2012).
23. Id. § 80b-2(c) (requiring the SEC to consider whether its rulemaking will
"promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.").
24. Coffee, supra note 16 (observing that "[o]n its face, this language is relatively
soft, mandating that the Commission only consider these impacts, not that the SEC determine
that the interests of investor protection outweigh those of efficiency, competition, and capital
formation").
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2).
26. Id.
27. 7 U.S.C. § 19(a)(2) (2012).
28. See infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
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provisions, nor in a careful analysis of the entire legislative record, 29 to support the
conclusion that "consider" means anything other than "to think about carefully" or
"to take into account." 3 0 The term "consider" is used frequently throughout the
federal securities laws-in more than 20 provisions in the Exchange Act alone. In
some provisions, as it did in the NSMIA, Congress instructs that the SEC "shall
consider" in the course of agency decision-making a specified factor or factors. In
other provisions, Congress specifies that the SEC "may" take certain matters or
factors into consideration. For example, Exchange Act § 21B authorizes the SEC to
impose civil monetary penalties in agency cease-and-desist proceedings and
subsection (c) enumerates six factors that the SEC "may" consider in making its
determination as to "whether a penalty is in the public interest."3 1 When the SEC
adopts a final rule or issues a final order, it evidences its adherence to this "shall"
obligation, or its exercise of its "may" discretion, by including in its release the
factors it considered in the course of its decision-making.
Proponents of the view that the SEC is statutorily obligated to perform
cost-benefit analysis on its rulemaking further look to the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA").3 2 Section 706 of the APA authorizes federal courts to invalidate rules
that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."3 3 As the Supreme Court first emphasized in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,34 the "scope
of review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow and a court is not
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."3 5 However, in performing this
narrow review, courts are obliged to ensure that the agency has "examine[d] the
relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."3 6 In turn, the
judicial determination of whether an explanation is "satisfactory" requires a court to
"consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment."3 7 Thus, an agency rule could
be deemed "arbitrary and capricious" within the meaning of the APA "if the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
29. See James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes:
Confronting the D.C. Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEx. L. REv.
1811, 1818-24 (2012).
30. MERRIAN WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 246 (10th ed. 1996).
31. 15 U.S.C.§ 78u-2(c) (2012).
32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (2012).
33. Id. § 706(2)(A).
34. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
35. Id. at 43.
36. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
37. Id. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S.
281, 285 (1974)); see also Citizens to Pre. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
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that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise."38
Notwithstanding the type of "hard look" judicial review of agency
rulemaking it endorsed in State Farm, the Supreme Court has also emphasized the
necessity of according substantial deference when an agency's rulemaking interprets
an ambiguous provision in a statute (Chevron deference),3 9 or in the agency's own
rules and regulations (Seminole Rock deference).4 0 Accordingly, both Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Bowles v Seminole Rock
& Sand Co. impose on courts the obligation to accept all but unreasonable
interpretations of ambiguous regulatory provisions-even in circumstances where,
as a matter of first impression, a federal court would have construed the provision
differently.
In addition to its obligation under the federal securities laws to consider
specified factors, and its process-based obligations under the APA, SEC rulemaking
is subject to regulatory analysis requirements set out in several other statutes. These
statutes include: (1) the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires agencies to
analyze all rules that have or will have a "significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities";4 1 (2) the Congressional Review Act, which
requires agencies to submit rules, together with any cost-benefit analysis performed,
to Congress and the General Accountability Office ("GAO"), and delays the
effectiveness of "major rules" (defined as rules having an expected impact of at least
$100 million);4 2 and (3) the Paperwork Reduction Act, which requires agencies to
minimize the burdens of, and obtain Office of Management and Budget ("OMB")
approval for, "collections of information" from the public.43
2. The Executive Branch
As an independent regulatory agency, the SEC is not formally subject to
the cost-benefit analysis requirements in executive orders, which apply to rules
adopted by executive department agencies.4 4 Such requirements have been in place
since the Nixon Administration, and have been both ratcheted up and down in the
decades since.4 5 Executive Order 12,291, issued in 1981 by President Reagan,
prohibited executive agencies from undertaking any "regulatory action ... unless
the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs" and
required those agencies to choose the "alternative involving the least net cost to
society" of all available alternatives.4 6 But President Clinton tempered that mandate
38. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'nv. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
39. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
40. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
41. 5 U.S.C §§ 610-612 (2012).
42. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012).
43. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-21 (2012).
44. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012) (includes
a list of "independent regulatory agencies").
45. See Guynn, supra note 21, at 647.
46. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 § 2 (1981).
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through a process outlined in Executive Order 12,866, which remains in place
today.4 7 Among other changes, President Clinton's Order instructed executive
agencies to consider qualitative as well as quantitative measures of costs and
benefits, and merely obligated such agencies to provide "a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs."48 Three years later, the
OMB issued "best practices" for agencies bound by Executive Order 12,866,49
which were ultimately incorporated in OMB Circular A-4 during the George W.
Bush Administration."o President Obama's Executive Order 13,563 builds on those
mandates by instructing all executive agencies to use "the best available techniques
to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and costs as accurately as
possible."5 ' Executive Order 13,579 encourages-but does not require-
independent regulatory agencies to comply with the cost-benefit analysis
obligations set forth in Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563.52
3. The SEC's Policies and Practices
As an independent regulatory agency that has long regarded economic
analysis as "an essential part" of its rulemaking, 53 the SEC has frequently
emphasized the value of quantifying the expected costs and benefits of proposed
rules. 54 In the 1970s, the SEC added the first professional economists to its staff,5
who were formally organized into an office headed by a chief economist. 56 Soon
thereafter, the SEC voluntarily began to include a "cost-benefit analysis" section in
its rule proposals and adopting releases. 5 7 Some have speculated that the SEC's
motivation may have been a strategic attempt to dissuade the Nixon Administration
from attempting to extend the OMB's review of executive agency rulemaking to the
independent regulatory agencies.5 ' Throughout the 1980s, "the Chief Economist and
47. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
48. Id. §1(b)(6).
49. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (Jan. 11, 1996),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforegjriaguide#iii.
50. Circular A-4, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, (Sept. 17, 2003),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
51. Exec. Order 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
52. Exec. Order 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41587 (July 11, 2011).
53. See Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on TARP, 112th Cong, (2012) (statement
of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairperson, SEC).
54. See id. (stating that "our staff's guidance draws upon principles set forth in
OMB Circular A-4 and Executive Orders 12866 and 13563"); Audit No. 347, Rulemaking
Process, U.S. SECS. & EXCH'G COMM'N. (July 12, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/347fin.htm (stating that "the cost-benefit analysis section
of a rule is becoming increasingly significant and [SEC officials] intend to more consistently
follow the best practice principles in Executive Order 12866").
55. Henry T.C. Hu, Keynote Address: The SEC, Dodd-Frank, and Modern Capital
Markets, 7 NYU J. OF L. & Bus. 427, 432 (2011).
56. See Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 30 YALE J. oN REG. 289, 338-39 (2013).
57. Id. at 296.
58. Id. at 296-97.
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his staff had increasing prominence." 5 9 The Office of the Chief Economist later
expanded into an Office of Economic Analysis.6 0 Then in 2009, the SEC created a
new Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation ("RSFI"), which combined
three then-existing offices: the Office of Economic Analysis, Office of Risk
Assessment, and Office of Interactive Data.6 1 A final change occurred in June 2013
when, "to better reflect its core responsibilities and focus," the SEC renamed the
RSFI to the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.6 2
Over the last decade, the economists at the SEC have had their work
subjected to intensive scrutiny from various directions. In May 2012, in response in
large part to the "questions" raised in court decisions, GAO reports, and reports by
the SEC's Office of Inspector General-as well as in congressional inquiries-the
RSFI, along with the Office of General Counsel, issued and developed joint
guidance that emphasizes the value of conducting rigorous economic analysis in
SEC rulemaking.6 3 This relatively new guidance unambiguously endorses the
principles set forth in Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, and in OMC Circular A-
4. In so doing, it sets out several "substantive requirements for economic analysis in
SEC rulemaking," which obligate rule-writing staff in all SEC divisions to: (1)
"[c]learly identify the justification for the proposed rule";6 4 (2) "define the baseline"
against which the economic effects of a rule will be measured;6 5 (3) identify and
discuss "reasonable alternatives" to a proposed rule that might produce comparable
results with fewer economic costs;6 6 and (4) analyze a proposed rule's economic
consequences by "identify[ing] relevant benefits and costs" and "quantify[ing]
expected benefits and costs to the extent feasible."6 7 Although the SEC's issuance
of this guidance has been criticized by some as a "significant shift . . . which could
have profound implications for protecting the public, investors, and securities
markets,"6 8 it is important to recognize that the guidance regards cost-benefit
analysis as only one of the four enumerated requirements for economic analysis,
59. Thomas Lee Hazen, Roles and Functions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, SR043 ALI-ABA 31, 38 (2010).
60. See SEC, SEC Creates the Office of Economic Analysis, SEC NEWs DIGEST
88-19 (Feb. 1, 1988).
61. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Division of Risk Strategy and
Financial Innovation (Sept. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/
2009-199.htm.
62. Press Release, SEC, SEC Renames Division Focusing On Economic and Risk
Analysis (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail
/PressRelease/1365171575272#.UwqB44U2Dsk.
63. Memorandum from the Div. of Risk, Strategy, and Fin. Innovation (RFSI) and
the Office of Gen. Council, Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemakings 1
(Mar. 16, 2012), available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi-guidance-econ-a
naly-secrulemaking.pdf.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id. at 6.
66. Id. at 8.
67. Id. at 9.
68. Dennis M. Kelleher et al., BETTER MARKETS, INC, SETTING THE RECORD
STRAIGHT ON COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND FINANCIAL REFORM AT THE SEC 59 (2012).
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"rather than as a stand-alone approach to evaluating the economic effects of a
rule."6 9
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements Imposed Through Judicial Interpretation
Had SEC officials been left to their own devices, a rigorous cost-benefit
analysis may well have become the routine precursor for any major new rule. But
there is no escaping the fact that these officials now view themselves as practically
bound by the D.C. Circuit's "instruction that the [SEC] determine as best it can the
economic implications of the rules it promulgates." 7 0 This instruction emanates most
directly from the Business Roundtable decision,7 1 which was grounded in several
prior precedents, including American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC,7 2
and Chamber of Commerce v. SEC.73
In Business Roundtable, notwithstanding the more than 21,000 hours of
agency time expended in the development of Rule 14a-1 1's limited provision of
"proxy access" 7 4 and a more than 73-page (or nearly 40,000-word) economic
analysis of the rule upon its release,7 5 a unanimous D.C. Circuit panel vacated the
rule because, in its view, the SEC had acted "arbitrarily and capriciously for having
failed once again . . . adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule." 76 In
so doing, Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg, joined by Chief Judge David Sentelle
and Circuit Judge Janice Rogers Brown, did not defer to the SEC's assessment of
the rule's costs and benefits. Rather, the court found that:
[The SEC] inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and
benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or
to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected to
support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to
respond to substantial problems raised by commenters."
The court further emphasized that the SEC had failed with respect to its
"unique obligation" under § 3(f) of the Exchange Act to analyze rules for their
69. Craig M. Lewis, Chief Economist & Dir. Div. of Risk, Strategy, and Fin.
Innovation, Speech at the Pennsylvania Association of Public Employee Retirement Systems
Annual Spring Forum: Investor Protection Through Economic Analysis (May 23, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171575422#.UvqHf7
S2wXU.
70. See Brief of Respondent at 21, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5
(D.D.C. July 2013) (No. 12-1668) (responding to petition for review of the SEC's resource
extraction rule that was issued pursuant to the mandate in Exchange Act § 13(q), enacted as
part of the Dodd-Frank Act) (emphasis added).
71. See 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
72. 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
73. 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
74. See Schapiro Letter, supra note 8.
75. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Shareholder Access and Uneconomic Economic
Analysis: Business Roundtable v. SEC (University of Denver Legal Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 11-14), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract= 1917451.
76. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F. 3d at 1148 (citing Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v.
SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167-68 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 141).
77. Id. at 1148-49.
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impact upon "efficiency, competition, and capital formation," 78 and criticized the
SEC for its unwillingness to "make tough choices about which of the competing
estimates [it considered was] most plausible." 79 For these and other reasons, the
court also found that the SEC's decision to apply the proxy access rule to investment
companies was "arbitrary."so
As we now know from the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in American
Petroleum Institute v. SEC,` the petitioners in Business Roundtable lacked a
statutory entitlement to have their case heard initially by the D.C. Circuit. Although
the SEC advised the court that the petitioners' statement of jurisdiction under § 25(b)
of the Exchange Act was "not correct,"8 2 the agency expressly conceded that
jurisdiction was proper under the Exchange Act, § 25(a).8 3 The Business Roundtable
panel apparently adopted this view as well, but it made no specific finding on the
issue of jurisdiction. That jurisdictional distinction, however, garnered attention in
a subsequent rulemaking challenge to the SEC's so-called "resource extraction
rule," which the SEC promulgated pursuant to a congressional command in the
Dodd-Frank Act.8 4 To the great surprise of many, (most especially the SEC) 5 the
D.C. Circuit held, as a matter of first impression, that § 25(a)'s authorization of
original appellate jurisdiction over "final orders entered by the Commission
pursuant to [the Exchange Act]" does not encompass petitions by persons aggrieved
by final Exchange Act "rules."86 Instead, the jurisdictional provision for challenges
to final rules promulgated under the Exchange Act is exclusively § 25(b), which
extends appellate review only to persons "adversely affected by a rule promulgated
pursuant to" Exchange Act, §§ 9(h)(2), 11, 11A, 15(c)(5) or (6), 15A, 17, 17A, or
19.87 Accordingly, because the SEC's proxy access rule had been promulgated
pursuant to its authority under § 14 of the Exchange Act, the Business Roundtable
petitioners would today be required to initiate suit first in federal district court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the APA.
The SEC's defeat in Business Roundtable followed a series of similar
setbacks brought about by the D.C. Circuit's "super hard look review" of the SEC's
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1150 (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374
F.3d 1209, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
80. Id. at 1156.
81. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
82. Final Brief of Respondent at 6 n.1, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1021, 09-1056).
83. Id. (stating that "[t]lis Court has jurisdiction under [§] 25(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78y(a), not [§] 25(b)" and citing to Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of
Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
84. See infra notes 109, 111-13 and accompanying text.
85. See Am. Petroleum Inst., 714 F.3d at 1332 (observing that "the Commission
agree[d] with petitioners that we have jurisdiction to hear this petition for review" and
crediting intervenor Oxfam America for advancing the argument "that petitioners must first
sue in the district court").
86. Id. at 1333.
87. See id. (explaining that Exchange Act § 25(b) "not only expressly authorizes
appellate review of agency rules, but it limits that review to rules issued pursuant to specific
provisions of the Exchange Act, leaving all others to be challenged in the district court").
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cost-benefit analysis. " In 2010, the court in American Equity struck down SEC Rule
15 1A, which interpreted the statutory term "annuity contract" to exclude fixed-index
annuities, thereby subjecting such annuities to the registration provisions of the
Securities Act.8 9 Original appellate jurisdiction would have been proper in that case
because the rule had been promulgated pursuant to Securities Act § 19(a).90 Notably,
however, § 19(a) does not require consideration of either the "public interest" or
"the protection of investors," and thus lacks the textual predicate that triggers the
ostensible cost-benefit analysis command of Securities Act § 2(b). 91 Chief Judge
Sentelle, joined by Circuit Judges Ginsburg and Judith Rogers, nonetheless
invalidated Rule 151A because "the SEC failed to properly consider the effect of the
rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 92 In the court's view, the
SEC's failure to consider these effects rendered the rule "arbitrary and capricious"
under § 706 of the APA. 93
Chamber of Commerce,94 decided five years before American Equity, is
widely regarded as the "turning point" from the SEC's prior "blissful existence" in
the D.C. Circuit. 95 The case involved a mutual fund governance rule that exempted
certain types of transactions by mutual funds from otherwise applicable prohibitions
in the Investment Company Act ("ICA") provided that at least 75% of the fund's
directors, as well as the fund's chairperson, were independent from the investment
adviser that managed the fund. 96 The court's decision to invalidate that rule centered
on what the panel regarded as the SEC's "statutory obligation to do what it can to
apprise itself-and hence Congress and the public-of the economic consequences
of a proposed regulation before it decides whether to adopt the measure."97 And the
"consideration" command in § 3(c) of the ICA was the purported source of this
"statutory obligation."98 Chief Judge Ginsburg, joined by Circuit Judges Rogers and
David Tatel, held that the SEC "violated its obligation under [the ICA], and therefore
the APA, in failing adequately to consider the costs imposed upon funds by the two
challenged conditions." 99 The court further held that the SEC's acknowledgement
of its difficulties in estimating the costs of the funds compliance with those
conditions "did not excuse the Commission from its statutory obligation to
determine as best it can the economic implications of the rule it has proposed." 0 0 In
88. Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference
Dilemma, 61 DuKE L.J. 1763, 1773 n.40 (2012) (characterizing the Business Roundtable
decision as "super hard look review").
89. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 170-71 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
90. Unlike the Exchange Act, which has separate appellate review provision for
"final orders" and "final rules," the Securities Act has a unary provision, which extends
appellate review to "any person aggrieved by an order to the Commission."
91. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
92. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins., 613 F.3d at 167-68.
93. Id. at 178.
94. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC (Chamber 1), 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
95. Cox & Baucom, supra note 29, at 1814.
96. Chamber I, 412 F. 3d at 136.
97. Id. at 144.
98. Id. at 136.
99. Id. at 144.
100. Id. at 143.
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remanding this rule to the SEC "to address the deficiencies,"10 1 the principal
precedent relied on by the court was Public Citizen v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration,10 2 which involved a challenge to an agency rule that limited the
maximum number of hours commercial motor vehicle operators were allowed to
work. However, the Public Citizen court had invalidated that rule only after
concluding that the agency did not even consider whether-let alone comply with-
its statutory obligation to ensure that its rule would promote "driver health."1 03
In addition to the decisions in Business Roundtable, American Equity, and
Chamber of Commerce, in the six-year period 2005-2011, the D.C. Circuit
invalidated SEC rules on three other occasions 1 0 4 and vacated one SEC order.10 5 One
of those decisions struck down the mutual fund governance rule a second time, when
the SEC reissued the rule after considering additional economic data. 1 0 6 The same
petitioners again sought judicial review, and the D.C. Circuit again found fault with
the rulemaking process, this time because the SEC had "fail[ed] to comply with [§]
553(c) of the APA by relying on materials not in the rulemaking record without
affording an opportunity for public comment, to the prejudice of the [petitioner] ."107
Litigation challenges involving the SEC's rulemaking have continued
unabated in the D.C. Circuit, which now hosts a full judicial bench with the additions
of Judge Sri Srinivasan in May 2013, Judges Patricia Millett and Cornelia Pillar in
December 2013, and Judge Robert Wilkins in 2014. Indeed, a host of congressional
mandates in the Dodd-Frank Act have instructed the SEC to promulgate dozens of
rules that effectuate Congress's own policy judgments. Two of these rules were
challenged by industry groups within days of their adoptions: a conflict minerals
disclosure rule promulgated pursuant to Exchange Act § 13(p),10 s and a resource
extraction disclosure rule promulgated pursuant to Exchange Act § 13(q).1 09
After an initial ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the challenge to the resource extraction
disclosure rule in the first instance,110 the U.S. District Court for the District of
101. Id. at 145.
102. 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
103. Id. at 1216 (holding that "'the complete absen[c]e of any discussion' of a
statutorily mandated factor 'leaves us with no alternative but to conclude that [the agency]
failed to take account of this statutory limit on [its] authority,' making the agency's reasoning
arbitrary and capricious").
104. See, e.g., Fin. Planning Assoc. v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(invalidating rule that exempted broker-dealers from the Advisers Act notwithstanding their
receipt of "special compensation" that was "incidental" to their brokerage services); Chamber
of Commerce v. SEC (Chamber II), 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Goldstein v. SEC, 451
F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (invalidating rule requiring the registration of hedge fund advisers
under Advisers Act).
105. See, e.g., PAZ Secs., Inc v. SEC, 566 F.3d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (vacating an
SEC order that affirmed the NASD's expulsion of a member firm).
106. See Chamber H1, 443 F.3d at 890.
107. Id. at 894.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012).
109. Id. § 78m(q).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
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Columbia subsequently vacated SEC Rule 13q-1 on July 2, 2013 and remanded it to
the SEC for further proceedings."' Judge John Bates did not have to reach a number
of arguments made by the petitioners (including that the SEC's cost-benefit analysis
was flawed) because the court concluded that the SEC had "misread [§ 13(q)] to
mandate public disclosure of the reports, and its decision to deny any exemption
was, given the limited explanation provided, arbitrary and capricious. "112 The SEC
currently is working on a new proposal.1 13
The SEC may also be required to redraft a portion of the conflict minerals
disclosure rule for constitutional-rather than cost-benefit-analysis related-
reasons. The rule at issue, which was promulgated pursuant to the congressional
mandate in Exchange Act § 13(p), requires SEC reporting companies to submit a
Form SD disclosing their use of gold, tantalum, tin, and tungsten from the
Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") and adjacent countries, if those minerals
are "necessary" to one or more products made by the companies.1 14 The National
Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Business
Roundtable initially filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit, and then
subsequently moved for a transfer to district court based on the jurisdictional ruling
in American Petroleum Institute."' The plaintiffs then sought to convince the
district court that the SEC failed to conduct an adequate cost-benefit analysis and
misconstrued § 13(p) by failing to include a de minimis exemption.1 16 The plaintiffs
further argued that the rule unconstitutionally compelled speech in violation of the
First Amendment. 1 1 7
National Ass'n of Manufacturers v. SEC ultimately brought the SEC a
long-awaited victory in a rulemaking challenge, first at the district court level, 18 and
less than a year later, at the D.C. Circuit.1 19 On July 23, 2013, on the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment, then-District Judge-now D.C. Circuit Judge-
Robert Wilkins found "no problems with the SEC's rulemaking," and disagreed that
the conflict minerals disclosure scheme "transgresses the First Amendment." 1 2 0
Notably, in rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that the SEC had contravened its
statutory directives under the Exchange Act by failing to "'analyze properly the
costs and benefits' of the Rule as a whole," 1 2 1 Judge Wilkins confronted that asserted
premise head-on:
By their terms, [§§ 3(f) and 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act] only
obligate the SEC to "consider" the impact that a rule or regulation
111. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 25 (D.D.C. 2013).
112. Id. at 11.
113. Yin Wilczek, SEC Will Not Appeal Judgment Invalidating Its Resource
Extraction Rule, 45 SEc REG. & L. REP., Sept. 3, 2013.
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2012).
115. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see supra notes
85-87 and accompanying text.
116. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2013).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 82.
119. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
120. Nat'1Ass'n ofMfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
121. Id. at 55 (quoting Pls.' Brief at 26-27).
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may have on various economic-related factors-efficiency,
competition, and capital formation. In doing so, the Commission may
deem it appropriate (or even necessary) to weigh the costs and
benefits of its proposed action as related to these enumerated factors,
but to suggest that the Exchange Act mandates that the SEC conduct
some sort of broader, wide-ranging benefit analysis simply reads too
much into this statutory language.122
The court further found that there was simply "no statutory support for the
Plaintiffs' argument that the Commission was required to evaluate whether the
Conflict Minerals Rule would actually achieve the social benefits Congress
envisioned."12 3 But, while the court clearly drew a distinction between the rule's
"humanitarian" implications and "the economic implications" at issue in Business
Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce, and American Equity, it highlighted what it
found to be a second important distinction: namely, that those cases all involved
rules "that were proposed and adopted by the SEC of its own accord, with the
Commission having independently perceived a problem within its purview and
having exercised its own judgment to craft a rule or regulation aimed at that
problem." 1" The conflict minerals rule, in contrast, was promulgated "pursuant to
an express, statutory directive from Congress, which was driven by Congress 's
determination that the due diligence and disclosure requirements it enacted would
help to promote peace and security in the DRC." 12 5
In oral argument before D.C. Circuit Judges Sentelle, Srinivasan, and
Raymond Randolph, the SEC once again defended against the petitioner's claim that
its cost-benefit analysis was flawed.1 2 6 But the First Amendment concern that the
disclosure regime unconstitutionally compels private speech by forcing companies
to "self-stigmatize" captured far more attention from the panel than any particular
concern about the quality of the SEC's cost-benefit analysis. 12 7
The D.C. Circuit's April 2014 decision constituted an overall win for the
SEC, and an unequivocal one on the cost-benefit analysis challenge. 1 28 Indeed, for
the first time in nearly a decade, the court did not "see any problems with the
Commission's cost-side analysis." 129 It found that the SEC "exhaustively analyzed
the final rule's costs[,] . . . considered its own data as well and cost estimates
submitted during the comment period[,] ... and arrived at a large bottom line figure
that the Association does not challenge." 13 0 The court also credited the SEC for
122. Id. at 56.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 57-58.
125. Id. at 58. The court also questioned whether the "consider" command in
Exchange Act § 3(f) was even applicable "to this rulemaking in the first place" since Congress
did not use the triggering language when it required the SEC to issue a conflict minerals
disclosure rule pursuant to § 13(p) of the Exchange Act. Id. at 58 n.15.
126. Yin Wilczek, Judges Focus on First Amendment Issues In Oral Argument on
SEC Congo Rule Suit, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 68 (2014).
127. Id.
128. Nat'lAss'n ofMfrs., 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
129. Id. at 369.
130. Id.
144
2015] ILEP SYMPOSIUM 145
"specifically consider[ing] the issues listed [in Exchange Act § 3(f)],"13 1 and cited
the SEC's finding "that the rule would impose competitive costs, but have relatively
minor or offsetting effects on efficiency and capital formation." 132 On the benefit
side of the calculus, the court found it "difficult to see what the Commission could
have done better,"133 noting that the agency determined that Congress sought
"compelling social benefits" which the agency was "'unable to readily quantify' . . .
because it lacked data about the rule's effects."13 4 The court further emphasized that
an agency "need not conduct a 'rigorous, quantitative economic analysis' unless the
statute explicitly requires it to do so."135 Moreover, "[e]ven if one could estimate
how many lives are saved or rapes prevented as a direct result of the final rule, doing
so would be pointless because the costs of the rule-measured in dollars-would
create an apples-to-bricks comparison." 13 6 Congress itself made the overall
determination that the costs of conflict-minerals disclosures "were necessary and
appropriate in furthering the goals of peace and security in the Congo," and
therefore, the court refused to fault the SEC for its unwillingness to "second-guess
Congress."1 3 7
It remains to be seen whether NationalAss'n of Manufacturers signals the
D.C. Circuit's full-throttled return to its traditional approach of substantial deference
to an agency's rulemaking. The decision could well be merely a limited respite
aimed at agency rules that were promulgated pursuant to explicit congressional
directives. Ultimately, however, even though the court did not "see any problems
with" the SEC's cost-benefit analysis, it sided with the plaintiffs (by a 2-1 vote) on
the First Amendment challenge.13 8 The constitutionally infirm provisions required
certain public companies to describe their products as not "'DRC conflict free' in
the reports that they file with the SEC, and also required the companies to disclose
this information on their websites. 1 39 Judges Randolph and Sentelle viewed such
mandatory disclosure as a type of compelled speech that could only be justified by
a narrowly tailored regulation that directly and materially advances a substantial
government interest.1 4 0
In the wake of National Ass'n of Manufacturers, a sharply divided SEC
voted to implement those portions of the conflict minerals disclosure rule that were
not placed at issue in view of the court's First Amendment ruling.14 1 The D.C.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,350-51 (Sept. 12,
2012)).
133. Id.
134. Id (quoting Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,350 (Sept. 12, 2012)).
135. Id. (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n., 720 F.3d
370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 369, 370.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p)(1)A)(ii) & (E) (2012)).
140. Id. at 371-72.
141. Order Issuing Stay, In the Matter of Exchange Act Rule l3p-1 and Form SD,
Exchange Act Release no. 72079 (May 2, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/34-72079.pdf; see also Joint Statement on the Conflict
Minerals Decision, SEC Commissioners Daniel M. Gallagher & Michael S. Piwowar,
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Circuit subsequently granted the SEC a rehearing of the First Amendment
analysis.14 2 The rehearing was prompted by the D.C. Circuit's en banc decision in
American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, which clarified that
disclosure regulations may be directed at substantial governmental interests
"[b]eyond the interest in correcting misleading or confusing commercial speech." 1 43
But to prevail in the rehearing, the SEC will still have to defend Congress's
determination that conflict minerals disclosures directly advance "a substantial
government interest.""
C. Legislative Attempts to Heighten the SEC's Existing Cost-Benefit Analysis
Obligations
The House of Representatives passed the proposed SEC Regulatory
Accountability Act ("H.R. 1062") on May 17, 2013 by a vote of 235-161.145 The bill
would obligate the SEC to engage in mandatory cost-benefit analysis with respect
to every proposed "regulation," a term defined broadly to include "rules, orders of
general applicability, interpretative releases, and other statements of general
applicability that the agency intends to have the force and effect of law," but that
does not include internal SEC rules, regulations certified as "emergency action," or
regulations promulgated pursuant to an express statutory provision that explicitly
"prohibits compliance with this provision." 14 6 It requires the SEC to utilize "the
Chief Economist to assess the costs and benefits, both qualitative and quantitative,
of the intended regulation and propose or adopt a regulation only on a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the costs of the
regulation." 1 4 7 It further requires the SEC to explain why the regulation meets its
identified regulatory objectives "more effectively" than other available
alternatives, 1 4 8 and it obligates the SEC to "choose the approach that maximizes net
benefits." 1 49 In so doing, the SEC is expected to "evaluate whether, constituent with
the regulatory objectives the regulation is tailored to impose the least burden on
society, including market participants, individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and
other entities (including State and local governmental entities), taking into account,
to the extent practicable, the cumulative costs of the regulations." 1 50 Additionally,
the bill requires the SEC to explain the nature of the comments that it received in
the course of its rulemaking process, the changes that it made in response to those
Comm'rs, SEC (April 28, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541665582#_ednI (stating
that "the wisest course of action would be for the Commission to stay the effectiveness of the
entire rule until the litigation has concluded").
142. See Phylliss Diamond, D.C. Cir. Grants SEC Bid To Rehear Ruling in Conflict
Minerals Case, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 2245 (2014).
143. 760 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
144. Id.
145. Yin Wilczek, On Partisan Lines, House Passes Bill to Enhance SEC's
Economic Analyses, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 920 (2013).
146. H.R. 1062, 113th Cong. § 2(e)(6) (2013) (as passed by House, May 17, 2013).
147. Id. § 2(e)(1)(B).
148. Id. § 2(e)(1)(C).
149. Id. § 2(e)(2)(A).
150. Id. § 2(e)(2)(A)(ii).
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comments, and "the reasons that the Commission did not incorporate those industry
group concerns related to the potential costs or benefits in the final rule." 5
The proposed legislation also imposes requirements that go far beyond
mandatory cost-benefit analysis obligations in connection with new SEC
regulations. For "major" regulations expected to have an economic impact greater
than $100 million annually, the SEC would be required to publish an assessment,
within two years, which must include consideration of "costs, benefits, and intended
and unintended consequences" using performance measures that were identified
when the rule was adopted. 15 2 The SEC would also be required to review all
regulations every five years to determine whether any such regulations are
"outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and shall modify,
streamline, expand, or repeal them in ordinance with such review."1 5 3 Such
obligatory second-looks, including the need to perform a second cost-benefit
analysis on major regulations adopted only two years before, provide industry
groups with the opportunity to refight their battles with the SEC and possibly in
court as well.
When asked about the bill in the course of her recent testimony before the
House Committee on Financial Services, SEC Chairperson Mary Jo White
emphasized that, while she is "a firm supporter of rigorous economic analysis," she
nonetheless has substantial concerns about the bill, both in terms of the SEC's
"ability to carry out our rulemaking function expeditiously and to provide market
participants with certainty." 15 4 Chairperson White predicted that if enacted, the bill
"would create a lot of litigation that . .. would undermine our ability to do our job"
because its additional requirement would put the agency's rules "under constant
challenge." 5
Former SEC Chairperson Arthur Levitt has also spoken out against the bill,
acknowledging the "superficial" appeal of a mandate that requires regulators to
analyze and weigh the burden of a new rule against the benefits.1 5 6 But, in Levitt's
view, such analysis is "highly judgmental, and its outcome depends on the support
it has from Congress to get the data it needs."1 5 7 Levitt concluded as follows:
I would much rather have Congress recognize that cost-benefit work
requires that the commission have significantly more power and
resources to gather and analyze data. What we need is not a
requirement to do more cost-benefit analysis, but better tools to do
the work well and with more precision. Otherwise, cost-benefit
analysis will become a permanent and immovable wall to future
151. Id. § 2(e)(3).
152. Id. § 2(e)(5).
153. Id. § 2(e)(4).
154. Oversight of the SEC's Agenda, Operations, and FY 2014 Budget Request:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 113th Cong. 12, (May 16, 2013),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/113-20.pdf
155. Id. at 12-13.
156. Arthur Levitt, Op-Ed, Don 't Gutthe SEC, N.Y. TIMEs, August 7, 2011, at A19.
157. Id.
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efforts to improve the stability, safety and transparency of financial
markets.ss
President Obama's strong opposition to H.R. 1062 echoed a similar
theme.15 9 His statement of Administrative Policy emphasizes that the bill would: (1)
"add onerous procedures that would threaten the implementation of key reforms
related to financial stability and investor protection"; (2) instruct "the SEC to
conduct time- and resource-intensive assessments after it adopts or amends major
regulations before the impacts of the regulations may have occurred or be known";
and (3) "add analytical requirements that could result in unnecessary delays in the
rulemaking process, thereby undermining the ability of the SEC to effectively
execute its statutory mandates." 16 0
Not to be thwarted by the President's objections and the Senate's clear
unwillingness to act on the bill, 16 1 the House ultimately seized on an alternative way
to increase the amount of cost-benefit analysis in SEC rulemaking. The House-
Senate 2014 budget agreement allocated $1.35 billion to the SEC-very close to the
amount it received in 2013.162 But the SEC's meager increase of $29 million was
cannibalized by a rider directing the SEC to spend $44.5 million on activities within
the SEC's Division of Economic Analysis. 163 The net result was a near-30%
increase over the Division's budget from 2013.164 Congress mentioned no other SEC
division in the budget legislation, and it ignored the Obama Administration's
specific request for targeted funding for the Office of Compliance Inspections and
158. Id.
159. Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 1062-SEC Regulatory




161. The Senate, however, had pending legislation of its own, including the
Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act, S. 1173, 113th Cong. (2013), which was
introduced by Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Robert Portman (R-OH), and Mark Warner
(D-VA). The bill would permit the President to order all independent regulatory agencies,
including the SEC, to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of any new rule and to propose or adopt
such rule "only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the rule justify its
costs." In addition, for any "economically significant rule," independent agencies could be
required to submit the rule for review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
("OIRA"), a unit of the OMB. The OIRA review would then become part of the published
record for the rule. See Coates, supra note 3, at 924-26 (acknowledging the bill's proviso
that an agency's "compliance" with its requirements is not subject to judicial review, but
emphasizing "the fact that any public interagency process will create a larger record that will
be used by litigators to attack particular agency judgments as arbitrary and capricious under
the APA").
162. Mark Schoeff, Jr., Congress Stiffs SEC on Funding Request,
INVESTMENTNEWs (Jan. 14, 2014, 12:45 PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140114/FREE/140119947/congress-stiffs-sec-
on-funding-request.
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Examinations, which would have enabled the Office to add 250 new investment
adviser examiners to its existing staff of about 400.165
II. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF MANDATORY COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS
A. SEC Paralysis
As others have observed, the SEC's inclination to insulate itself from
litigation over the adequacy of its cost-benefit analysis has substantially slowed the
pace of its rulemaking, and has prompted it to shelf many important regulatory
initiatives.16 Additionally, extensive judicial scrutiny of the SEC's cost-benefit
assessments has decreased its willingness to revise and improve upon existing
rules. 1 67
Yet even before Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce, the SEC
would sometimes view cost-benefit analysis as an insurmountable obstacle that
impeded important regulatory change. Consider, for instance, Arthur Levitt's
account of the SEC's skirmish with the accounting industry in the late 1990s over a
rule that would have required greater auditor independence:
[W]hen I moved to implement regulation prohibiting accounting
firms from doing auditing and consulting work for the same
companies, the Big Five firms threatened litigation, saying we had to
do a cost-benefit analysis. Problem was, the big audit firms alone held
the cost data. We asked them for those data, which they declined to
provide.
Meanwhile, the benefits of the proposed rules were clear to me- they
would have raised investor confidence in the quality of audits but
were difficult to quantify with precision. We were stuck, and the rule
proposal died.
The fact that the S.E.C. was vindicated later, when these audit
conflicts were identified as one of the accelerants of the dot-com
bubble and our proposed independence rules were incorporated into
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley securities law, is of little solace to me.168
The controversy surrounding the appropriate standard of conduct for the
providers of investment advice to retail investors provides a more recent example of
the SEC's "paralysis by analysis." 1 6 9 Although the SEC was poised in early 2011 to
propose a new rule that would have codified a recommendation to establish a
uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers-a
165. Id.
166. See Hillary J. Allen, A New Philosophy For Financial Stability Regulation, 45
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 173, 176 (2013) (observing that the delay in the implementation of key
Dodd-Frank provisions can be attributed in part to "regulators girding for future
administrative law challenges by engaging in painstaking consultation with the industry over
the intricacies of their rulemaking"); Black, supra note 12, at 783.
167. See Allen, supra note 166, at 176; Black, supra note 12.
168. Levitt, supra note 156.
169. See McGarity, supra note 17.
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recommendation embodied in a staff study that was mandated in the Dodd-Frank
Act-the process was held in abeyance for more than two years. 1 70 Then, in March
2013, the agency restarted its engine, but only with the quiet hum of an SEC Release
"requesting data and other information, in particular quantitative data and economic
analysis, relating to the benefits and costs that could result from various alternative
approaches regarding the standards of conduct and other obligations of broker-
dealers and investment advisers." 1 71 And although the SEC has included fiduciary
duty rulemaking in its long-term agenda for 2014, few expect the SEC to be "moving
soon" and to be "looking to fight new fights this year." 17 2 One ironic twist involves
a recent assertion by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association's
General Counsel that the Department of Labor should "stand down" and not issue
an expected proposed rule regarding its definition of fiduciary standard of care until
the SEC issues its own rules on the subject. 1 73 But the SEC itself appears to be
standing down, in all likelihood because it lacks the fortitude to wage a litigation
battle with the broker-dealer industry over the adequacy of its cost-benefit analysis.
The SEC's rulemaking obligation under the Dodd-Frank Act to require so-
called CEO pay ratio disclosures further illustrates the current paralysis. Section
953(b) of the Act directed the SEC to require publicly traded companies to disclose
the ratio of the median total annual income for all employees to the annual income
of their chief executive officer in their annual reports. 1 74 The SEC issued these
proposed rules with an accompanying cost-benefit analysis in September 2013.175
The Chamber of Commerce's Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness has
claimed it would cost such companies more than $700 million a year to comply with
the proposed pay ratio rules, compared to the $72.7 million estimated in the SEC
release (an underestimate by more than 870%) and that the SEC likewise
"underestimated compliance time by 560[%]."176 But investor advocates have
countered that "'America's corporations are not going to be spending 3.6 million
hours' to calculate 'how much their typical workers take home,"' and that "the
Chamber's cost-benefit analysis was derived from a survey of about 3.1 [%] of the
companies that would be covered by the SEC pay ratio rule, once adopted." 1 7 7
170. See Black, supra note 12.
171. Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers, SEC Release No. 34-
69013, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,848, 14,848 (Mar. 7, 2013).
172. Yin Wilczek, In 2014, SEC Will Focus on Advancing Dodd-Frank, JOBS Act
Rule Mandates, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 141 (2014) (quoting statements by John Olson, a
partner at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, and Keir Gumbs, a partner at Covington & Burling
LLP).
173. Stephen Joyce, Refrain From Fiduciary Rulemaking Until SEC Acts on
Unified Standard, SIFMA Says, 46 SEC REG. & L. REP. 162 (2014).
174. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 § 953(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
175. Proposed Rule-Pay Ratio Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-70443
(Sept. 18, 2013).
176. Yin Wilczek, U.S. Chamber Says SEC Underestimated Costs of Pay Ratio
Proposal by 870 Percent, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1063 (2014) (quoting and hyperlinking
letter).
177. Id. (quoting Sam Pizzigati, an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy
Studies).
150
2015] ILEP SYMPOSIUM 151
Despite the mandate in the Dodd-Frank Act dating back more than four years, the
SEC has yet to adopt final pay ratio rules.
B. Investor-Driven Rulemaking Challenges
As the litigation battles discussed in Part I of this Article reflect, thus far,
challenges to the adequacy of the SEC's cost-benefit analysis have been initiated
and funded almost entirely by business trade groups such as the Business
Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce. These trade groups have been
remarkably successful in convincing the D.C. Circuit to invalidate SEC rules that
impose new and unwelcomed costs on the their members. But it is only a matter of
time before investor- or consumer-protection groups begin to launch their own cost-
benefit-analysis-based challenges. These challenges will almost certainly be
mounted to thwart deregulatory rules, and will be bolstered by likely assertions that
the SEC underestimated the investor or consumer benefits arising from existing
regulatory protections, and overestimated the costs imposed by the status quo.17 8
"Rigorous" cost-benefit analysis, moreover, need not be confined to quantitatively
estimating the monetary costs and benefits of a new SEC rule or the significant
revision of a long-standing one. The analysis in cost-benefit analysis can also take
into account the emotional costs and benefits of new policies and regulations.1 7 9
Consider, for example, the SEC's proposed "Regulation Crowdfunding,"
which would allow issuers that are not SEC reporting companies to raise capital up
to $1 million annually through the offer and sale of crowdfunded securities.80
Although it was the small business community that lobbied Congress for the JOBS
Act provision that added this new transactional exemption to the Securities Act, the
proposed regulation is drawing intense criticism from that very community and its
supporters in Congress."' Indeed, the SEC has been called upon "to ease the costs
and burdens of the proposed requirements."1 8 2 The small business community and
other market participants can be expected to push hard for revisions during the
regulation's period of notice and comment because, once the SEC issues a final rule,
a rulemaking challenge would be self-defeating. The Securities Act's new
178. See Coates, supra note 3, at 916 (observing that cost-benefit analysis of
financial regulation "can slow or stop deregulation as easily as it can slow or stop new
regulation"). Investor- or consumer-driven litigation likewise can-and has-been initiated
to challenge the SEC's failure to enact rules that must be issued pursuant to congressional
mandates. See Yin Wilczek, Relief Group Wants SEC to Issue Resource Payment Proposal
by August, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 211 (2015) (reporting on lawsuit filed by Oxfam, which
alleges that the SEC's "repeated failure to meet statutorily required deadlines [in connection
with the resource extraction disclosure rule] presents a clear and indisputable instance of
agency action 'unlawfully withheld' under the Administrative Procedure Act").
179. Huang, supra note 5.
180. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,498-99 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013).
See also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfunding
(Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/Press
Release/1370540017677#.VLQ5X1pbS.
181. Yin Wilczek, In 2014, SEC Will Focus on Advancing Dodd-Frank, JOBS Act
Rule Mandates, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP 141 (2014).
182. Id.
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crowdfunding exemption is not self-executing, and thus even a burdensome
regulation would be preferable to no regulatory exemption at all.
Regulation Crowdfunding, however, could face a rulemaking challenge
from a different direction entirely. An investor protection group could, perhaps,
initiate a lawsuit alleging that the SEC had failed to adequately consider "the
interests of investors" when it acceded to requests by market participants to remove
some of the regulatory burdens on small businesses.1 83 Such a challenge could
possibly zero in on the exemption's effects on investors who are traditionally
vulnerable to high-pressure sales tactics, such as senior citizens. Indeed, as SEC
Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar emphasized in a recent speech, "[e]lder financial
abuse is a problem growing exponentially, and the SEC must remain vigilant in
detecting and prosecuting fraud targeted at the elderly."1 8 4 Although Commissioner
Aguilar voted in favor of the proposed Regulation Crowdfunding, he and
Commissioner Kara Stein did so only after voicing their concerns about the
"substantial risks" involved. Commissioner Aguilar was especially concerned about
the potential for "affinity frauds," and he welcomed comments from investor
advocates as to whether "the proposed rules have enough safeguards built-in to
protect investors from fraud and self-dealing and to provide them with confidence
that they are being dealt with fairly and honestly." 8
Commissioner Aguilar's tepid support for the proposed Regulation
Crowdfunding came on the heels of his outright dissent to the SEC rules (including
new Reg D Rule 506(c)) that lifted the bans on general solicitation and advertising
that previously applied to most private placements.1 8 6 His dissenting statement
emphasized that he was "disappointed and saddened by the reckless adoption" of
these rules, which he regarded as "com[ing] at the expense of investors and plac [ing]
investors at greater risk." 18 7
183. See Press Release, North American Securities Administrators Association,
NASAA: The JOBS Act an Investor Protection Disaster Waiting to Happen (Mar. 22, 2012),
available at http://www.nasaa.org/11548/nasaa-the-jobs-act-an-investor-protection-disaster-
waiting-to-happen/ (launching staunch criticism at the preemption of states from reviewing
crowdfunding offerings, particularly in light of the foreseeable lack of scrutiny by the SEC
and the predictable amount of fraudulent transactions).
184. SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Protecting the Financial Future of
Seniors and Retirees, Address at the American Retirement Initiative's Winter 2014 Summit,
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Sp
eech/1 370540744550#.UvaSErS2wXU.
185. See SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Harnessing the Internet to Promote
Access to Capital for Small Businesses, While Protecting the Interests of Investors, Address
in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 23. 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail
/Speech/1370540003081#.VLQ8plpbRFI .
186. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, SEC Release No. 34-69959, 78 Fed. Reg.
44,771 (July 24, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239 and 242).
187. SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Facilitating General Solicitation at the
Expense of Investors, Address in Washington, D.C. (July 10, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539684712#.UvaWzLS2wXU.
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Yet Commissioner Aguilar launched his starkest criticism at the SEC's
rulemaking process, going so far as to categorize it as "fatally flawed."' In his
view, the "primary error" was traceable to the proposing release, which "excluded
any substantive discussion of the various suggestions to mitigate risk from general
solicitation that were raised by commenters prior to the issuance of the proposal."1 8 9
This exclusion prevented the SEC "from considering such suggestions at the
adopting phase of the rulemaking."1 90 His dissent went on to explain that:
Numerous alternatives to the stripped-down version of the rule
adopted here today are in the record, but-instead of considering
them as part of the process of removing the ban on general
solicitation, when it mattered most-the majority dismissed them
out-of-hand, without data, without analysis, and without any
substantive explanation.1 91
Thus, he chastised his fellow Commissioners for ignoring the SEC staff's guidance
on economic analysis, which requires an "[i]dentification of alternative regulatory
approaches, together with an evaluation of the benefits and costs, both quantitative
and qualitative, of the main alternatives."1 92 And seizing a page from the business
trade groups' playbook, he accused the SEC of abandoning its judicially recognized
duty to enact rules "on the basis of empirical data and sound analysis"1 93 and to
ensure that such analysis "include[s] adequate consideration of reasonable
alternatives." 1 94 He further faulted the SEC for failing "to adequately assess the
economic effects of the new rule."1 95 That economic analysis, in his view, included
"numerous unsupported conclusions," "unexplained contradictions," and repeated
acknowledgements that the SEC's "data on the Rule 506 market is unreliable or
incomplete." 1 96
In addition to its newly adopted Reg. D Rule 506(c) and proposed rules for
the crowdfunding exemption, the SEC's rulemaking docket includes a number of
other deregulatory initiatives mandated by the JOBS Act. These deregulatory
initiatives include a so-called Reg. A+, which, as currently proposed, could also
draw claims that it places investors at great risk.197 The proposing release
contemplates an expansion of Reg. A that would allow nonreporting companies to
conduct offerings of up to $50 million per year.198 And under the proposed rules,
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offerings with dollar amounts $5-$50 million.199 Not surprisingly, state securities
regulators have begun "lobbying efforts to try to persuade the SEC to change its
mind on the preemption of blue sky laws for Tier 2 offerings." 2 0 0 Militating in favor
of preemption is the frequently asserted claim that "'more than half the cost' [of a
Reg. A offering is] in dealing with the states." 2 0 1 Militating against a preemption
provision is the possibility of a streamlined state review process for Reg. A+
offerings, which is currently being developed by the North American Securities
Administrators Association ("NASAA). 2 0 2 Although it is unlikely that NASAA
would seek to invalidate any final regulation that is adopted by the SEC, NASAA
has emphasized that there is "[u]ncertainty regarding the rule's ability to withstand
a legal challenge," and that this uncertainty "may discourage companies ... from
utilizing the federal exemption." 2 03
C. Regulation by Enforcement
Rulemaking, of course, is only one of the several vehicles used by the SEC
to develop and apply its policy choices. The SEC can also effectively impose new
regulatory requirements through the process of adjudicating administrative
proceedings against alleged securities law violators or through the initiation of
enforcement actions in federal district court. The Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged in SEC v. Chenery Corporation20 that the announcement of a new
regulatory interpretation in the course of a litigated proceeding will necessarily have
a retroactive effect on the individual or entity subject to prosecution.205 But the Court
nonetheless held that announcing new rules of law by means of adjudication was not
an abuse of discretion per se. 2 06 Indeed, the Court went so far as to emphasize that
"the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency." 207 And citing Chenery, the D.C. Circuit has highlighted this discretion by
observing that "it is the agency, not the court, which determines whether to proceed
by rulemaking, by individual adjudication, or by a combination of the two." 2 0 8
The SEC, however, need not apply rigorous cost-benefit analysis to its
enforcement determinations. It may well choose to perform such analysis
voluntarily in certain instances as an effective tool of policymaking. But it is by no
means required to do so-and even the most ambitious legislative proposals for
199. Id. at 3930.
200. Wilczek, supra note 172.
201. Yin Wilczek, Capital Formation: General Solicitation Not as Popular as
Expected; Challenges Loom Ahead, 46 SEC. REG. L. REP. 62 (2014) (quoting Martin Dunn, a
partner at Morrison & Foerster).
202. Id.
203. Comment Letter from North American Securities Administrators Association
to Mary Jo White, SEC Chairperson (February 19, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-12.pdf.
204. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
205. Id. at 203-04.
206. Id.
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208. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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heightened cost-benefit analysis obligations stop sort of mandating such analyses
for the SEC's prosecutorial decisions and adjudications.
Increased regulation by enforcement is thus another likely consequence of
the high level of judicial scrutiny applied to SEC rulemaking. We can also expect to
see substantially more regulation by enforcement if the proposed SEC Regulatory
Accountability Act becomes law.
Some scholars are already convinced that "the lengthy rule writing and
rulemaking process" should be replaced on occasion with a regulation-by-
enforcement approach that relies on courts and regulators to shape "the precise
boundaries of what is prohibited and what is not." 20 9 Professor Frank Partnoy, for
example, observes that "there are numerous new areas of financial market practice
where this kind of approach might be preferable to establishing detailed rules in
advance"-and, in particular, he emphasizes that such ex post assessments would
avoid "detailed scrutiny" of an agency's cost-benefit analysis. 2 1 0 Professor Partnoy
provides an illustration that centers on the proliferation of structured notes being
sold to retail investors. He suggests that instead of considering "new rules designed
to require disclosure and impose specific standards, such as suitability," the SEC
could simply initiate a series of enforcement actions against the sellers of structured
notes. 2 11 Then, "[t]hrough the adjudication of these cases, regulators-and judges-
might establish new ex post standards to govern not only the conduct of the actors
in those cases, but other future actors as well." 2 1 2 Other scholars, while not
necessarily advocating for that approach, have nonetheless recognized that "when
the SEC brings enforcement actions, it does not have to do cost-benefit analysis." 2 13
Perhaps the SEC could even use regulation-by-enforcement to bring about
proxy access, notwithstanding the rulemaking challenge and its ultimate loss in
Business Roundtable.2 14 Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act21 5 and SEC Rule 14a-
9216 already extend broad antifraud authority to the SEC. Thus, the SEC could
possibly use these provisions to effectively require publicly traded companies to
disclose information about shareholder nominees in their proxy statements. As one
scholar has argued, "[t]o the extent companies are seeking proxies for their
candidates, shareholders likely have a need to know that in fact there are other
candidates that may be nominated at the meeting." 2 17 With this regulation by
209. Frank Partnoy, The Right Way to Regulate from Behind, 18 N.C. BANKING
INST. 113, 118 (2013).
210. Id. (citing Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 118-19.
213. James D. Cox, Headwinds Confronting the SEC, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 105,
107 (2013).
214. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012).
216. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2014).
217. See J. Robert Brown, Shareholder Access and the Uneconomic Economic
Analysis: Business Roundtable v. SEC (Part 11), RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Sept. 9, 2011, 6:00
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enforcement approach, he explains, "there is no need to conduct an economic
analysis of any kind."2 1 8
The paradox here is that "for the most part, the regulated prefer that
regulators utilize rulemaking over principles-based enforcement actions .... ."219 The
reasons for this preference are many and have been explored in detail by others
including, most famously by former SEC Commissioner, now Professor Roberta
Karmel, and former SEC Chairperson Harvey Pitt. Professor Karmel was one of the
first scholars to indict the SEC for "abus[ing] its prosecutorial independence by
transforming its enforcement program into a policy-making, and, therefore, highly
political tool." 2 20 She further argued that regulation by enforcement is antithetical to
the values of governmental transparency and public participation, emphasizing that
"[o]ther regulated persons who will become subject to [a] regulatory policy do not
have the opportunity to object or to comment upon the new interpretation or rule, as
they would have in a rulemaking proceeding." 2 2 1 Pitt and co-author Karen Shapiro
echoed this critique and likewise argued "that notions of due process require ample,
advance notification of precisely what types of conduct will be prohibited, before
any person may be civilly or criminally prosecuted for a violation of those
standards." 2 2 2
D. Informal Guidance That Creates New and Practically Binding Law
The SEC hardly needs the extensive judicial scrutiny applied to its cost-
benefit analysis to highlight the advantages of bypassing rulemaking altogether by
announcing policy via informal mechanisms-for decades, it has routinely done so
through no-action letters. 2 23 And like the choice to announce regulatory
interpretations through enforcement proceedings instead of rulemaking, courts are
typically reluctant to interfere with this "policymaking form" choice. 2 2
As I have argued elsewhere, whether courts regard SEC no-actions letters
as "law or lore," those letters substantially affect the behavior of all market
participants, rather than merely the particular no-action letter recipients. 2 25 Indeed,
by announcing regulatory interpretations through the vehicle of no-action letters, the
SEC can both encourage favored conduct and discourage disfavored action and
practices or, in some cases, eliminate them entirely.
But a host of problems can emerge when the SEC uses the no-action letter
process as a policymaking tool. Such harms include: regulatory inefficiencies
218. Id.
219. James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DuKE
L.J. 625, 663 (2007).
220. KARMEL, supra note 19, at 336.
221. Id. at 96.
222. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 167.
223. See Nagy, supra note 20, at 948-53.
224. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1383, 1383-84 (2004) (discussing the extensive discretion typically accorded
administrative agencies in connection with their selection of policymaking formats).
225. See Nagy, supra note 20, at 923.
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because the process is "time-consuming and cumbersome"; 2 26 the absence of public
participation that could provide the SEC with valuable insights and perspectives; 2 2 7
and an increased likelihood of agency capture, due to the fact that the no-action
process is essentially a private negotiation between the SEC and the requestor. 2 28
Equally troubling is the fact that, when a so-called regulatory interpretation
announced in a no-action letter exceeds a reasonable and fair explanation of an
existing statute or rule, the no-action letter process "contravenes the spirit, and
arguably the letter of the APA's notice and comment provisions." 2 29 My prior
research reveals that, on a host of occasions, the SEC "has used the no-action letter
process to graft new, substantive standards and obligations onto existing statutes or
SEC rules" and "then applies these grafted norms in the course of its regulatory
reviews, compliance examinations, and enforcement decisions as if they were
regulatory requirements." 23 0 While judicial review of regulatory "interpretations"
announced in no-action letters is theoretically possible, it is extraordinarily difficult
to obtain, because despite their practical effect, courts typically do not view such
letters as "final orders" of the SEC.2 3 1
Like the SEC's enforcement determinations, its no-action letter process
clearly lacks a mandatory cost-benefit analysis component. Nor does a mandatory
cost-benefit analysis obligation apply to regulatory interpretations announced in
SEC releases, guidelines, or other types of agency or division-issued guidance.
Congress requires the SEC to consider "efficiency, competition, and capital
formation" in the course of its rulemaking, but even then, only in the course of
agency rulemaking where it is also statutorily obliged to consider "investor
protection. 232 And as we have seen, the D.C. Circuit's view that the SEC is
statutorily required "to determine as best it can the economic implications of the rule
it has proposed" stems entirely from this "consideration" mandate as well. 2 3 3
Scholars have focused on this legal distinction between formats and, not
surprisingly, have urged the SEC to eschew rulemaking by issuing guidance in
certain particularly contentious policy areas.234 However, Congress-or at least a
majority in the House-is arguably trying to stay one step ahead. The proposed SEC
Regulatory Accountability Act imposes its uber cost-benefit analysis mandate on
SEC "regulations," a term that is broadly defined to include any "agency statement
of general applicability and future effect that is designed to implement, interpret, or
226. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 1.4[4] (6th ed. 2009).
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234. See, e.g., Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Right Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA.
J. INT'L L. 97, 123 (2013) (suggesting the issuance of interpretive guidance that "clarifies
companies' existing obligations to disclose human rights-related material risks" and
emphasizing that such interpretative guidance would not require "a cost-benefit analysis that
could be challenged in court").
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prescribe law or policy" and specifically includes "interpretive releases and other
statements of general applicability that the agency intends to have the force and
effect of law." 23 5 This definition, however, would not extend to most no-action
letters because they are typically issued by the SEC's staff, and not the agency itself.
Thus one likely consequence of the Act would be a strengthening of the SEC's
existing penchant for using no-action letters for policymaking. But the proposed
definition of "regulation" would encompass a wide array of SEC releases and policy
statements, and thus the Act's requirements could apply to agency pronouncements
that currently can be issued outside of the notice and comment requirements of the
APA.23 6 In that event, the likely result would be a reduction in the number SEC
releases and even more de facto regulation through the informal guidance contained
in SEC no-action letters.
E. Fewer Congressional Delegations of Authority or Discretion to the SEC
Congress, of course, is not under any particular obligation to ensure that
the securities legislation it passes satisfies rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Indeed,
Congress can dispense entirely with economic analysis whenever it deems it
politically expedient to do so. Congress, therefore, at least on occasion, may avoid
delegations of authority to the SEC and may tackle the legislative crafting of detailed
statutory provisions itself. Doing so enables Congress to sidestep the "paralysis by
analysis" that inflicts the SEC while reducing the risk that an SEC rule will be struck
down because of inadequate cost-benefit analysis. 23 7
Consider, for example, the crowdfunding exemption in the JOBS Act.
While it is possible that an investor-protection group could challenge that
regulation, 23 8 it was Congress-not the SEC-that conducted the regulatory
calculation and found that the benefits to small businesses outweighed the potential
risks to investors. 23 9 As others have recognized, Congress accorded the SEC
remarkably little discretion over that exemption, notwithstanding Congress's own
lack of administrative expertise.240 As Judge Wilkins recently emphasized in
NationalAss'n ofManufacturers, a rule that is promulgated pursuant to an "express,
statutory direction from Congress" commands greater deference than a rule that was
"proposed and adopted by the SEC of its own accord, with the Commission having
independently perceived a problem within its purview and having exercised its own
235. H.R. 1062, 113th Cong. § 2(e)(6)(A) (2013) (as passed by House, May 17,
2013).
236. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2012).
237. See Coffee, supra note 16, at 1067, 1080 (recognizing the possibility that
"Congress could legislate its own standards without delegating the matter to administrative
agencies," but "stop[ing] short of recommending any across-the-board movement towards
greater legislative specificity because it would entail undesirable rigidity"); see also Coates,
supra note 3, at 917 (observing that rigorous judicial review of the adequacy of cost-benefit
analysis in financial regulation has "given expert agencies an incentive to ask an inexpert
Congress to tie their hands with inflexible statutory commands").
238. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 180-82.
240. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1457 (2013).
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judgment to craft a rule or regulation aimed at that problem." 241 Regulation
Crowdfunding falls clearly within the former category.
Congress may also be motivated to go even further than it did in the JOBS
Act by enacting securities regulation that is self-executing, thereby eliminating any
discretion on the part of the SEC. Congress followed this path, for example, when it
passed the so-called Threat Reduction Act in August 2012.242 Section 219 of that
Act added a new § 13(r) to the Exchange Act that directly obligates SEC reporting
companies to include in their annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on
Form 10-Q certain disclosures about their Iran-related dealings. 24 3 Like the resource
extraction reporting rule (now vacated), and the conflict minerals reporting rule
(awaiting a decision on rehearing by the D.C. Circuit), business-trade groups have
been very vocal about the costs associated with Iran-related reporting.2 4 But
Congress's Iran-related reporting requirement is impervious to a legal challenge-
at least on cost-benefit analysis grounds-because the obligation stems directly
from an express statutory provision rather than an SEC rule.4 It is therefore quite
possible that we will be seeing other "direct" social and political reporting
provisions in federal securities laws in the future. 2 4 6
CONCLUSION
Cost-benefit analysis can be a valuable tool when deployed voluntarily to
improve the rulemaking process and the overall quality of SEC rules. But troubling
consequences ensue when the SEC's discretion is swept away and cost-benefit
analysis requirements are effectively-or explicitly-mandated. As this Article has
shown, the costs of such mandatory analysis in SEC rulemaking include: SEC
paralysis, new investor-driven challenges to deregulatory initiatives, an increasing
tendency for regulation by enforcement, a greater penchant for informal and
241. See supra text accompanying note 124. Reinforcing Judge Wilkins's ruling,
the D.C. Circuit likewise observed that had the SEC "second-guessed" Congress's conclusion
"that a disclosure regime would help promote peace and stability in the Congo," then "it
would have been in an impossible position" because "promulgating some rule is exactly what
Dodd-Frank required the Commission to do"). Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359,
370 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
242. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th
Cong. § 219 (2012).
243. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(r) (2012).
244. Yin Wilczek, Ex-SEC Official: Stay Tuned for Congress To Require More
Social, Political Disclosures, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1638 (2013) (quoting statements that
compliance with the Iran requirements has been "a ton of work" and "very, very expensive").
245. The SEC staff has, however, issued interpretative guidance on the
implementation of these new requirements. See Questions 147.01-147.07 in Compliance and
Disclosure Interpretations: Exchange Act Sections, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/exchangeactsections-interps.htm (last visited
Jan. 12, 2015).
246. See Wilczek, supra note 244 (referencing former SEC Corp. Fin. Director
Meredith Cross's observations about Congress's "extremely strong" temptation "to require
companies to provide disclosure about an activity as opposed to regulating the activity
directly").
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unofficial rulemaking by the SEC staff, and fewer congressional delegations of
authority or discretion to the SEC. For anyone seeking to apply a cost-benefit test
to the question of imposing new cost-benefit tests, an understanding of all these
costs is essential.
